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ABSTRACT: The situation of the formerly communist countries represents 
an anomaly within the sociological debate about the various secularisation 
processes currently underway in Europe. The main issues relate to whether 
or not Eastern Europe has experienced a religious revival following the fall of 
communism and, if so, which dimensions of religiosity are most involved in 
that revival. Sociologists have yet to reach a clear consensus on country trends 
or on the impact of Christian doctrines on these processes. We will address 
these issues throughout this article. The results from different piecewise 
regression analyses of European Values Study (EVS) data show that regular 
religious practice in general is declining from cohort to cohort, whereas 
religious belief has shown a revival followed by a decrease from the oldest to 
the youngest cohorts. The impact of a country’s main religious traditions is a 
relevant factor; predominantly Orthodox countries, for example, break with 
the overall results by showing a slight increase of religious practice as well 
as stable (and very high) belief among the youngest cohort. This situation is 
primarily driven by data from the Russian Federation and Bulgaria.
KEYWORDS: religiosity, Eastern Europe, multidimensional, cohort
Eastern European Religiosity during and after the Fall of Communism
The sociological discourse about European religiosity is undoubtedly focussed on 
secularisation processes (Bruce 2002; Gorski and Altınordu 2008; Voas and Doebler 2011). The 
main tenets of such discussions are that processes of modernisation have a negative effect on 
the stability and vitality of religious communities, practices, and convictions (Pollack 2008). 
Given this unambiguous agreement about the strong secularisation Europe is experiencing, 
the situation in the former communist countries deserves further investigation (Pickel and 
Sammet 2012). Whether we speak about religious stability or whether we hypothesise a 
religious reawakening, Eastern Europe represents an anomaly within the main discourse 
about European religious change. Many scholars have no doubts about this point. According 
to Greeley, for example, “One can say with considerable confidence that religion is reviving 
in the former socialist countries” (2002, 76), while Evans and Northmore-Ball (2012, 795) state 
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that “the resurgence of Orthodoxy in Russia provides a robust exception to secularization 
trends in Western Europe”. Tomka (2010, 14) argues that “the religious revival observed in 
this region and time period can hardly be harmonized with the hypotheses of secularization 
theory”. 
When speaking about Eastern European religion and religiosity, the period of the communist 
regime represented a divide between what was before and what came after. Before World War 
II, religion had been one of the cornerstones of the societal order and of the state itself, but 
“under the Communist era it was persecuted and pushed to the private sphere” (Tomka 2010, 
1). The regime imposed a “politically forced” secularisation (Meulemann 2004, 49; Müller and 
Neundord 2012, 567) as a means of undermining religious traditions and the transmission 
of belief in the name of scientific materialism. This religion suppression treated believers as 
second-class citizens by excluding them from organisations, the media, industrial management, 
the officer corps, membership in the Communist Party, and upper-level government positions 
(Ramet 1987). 
Under these conditions of severe repression, the religious landscape became polarised into 
two competing branches: a severely repressed church and the officially promoted atheistic 
alternative promoted under the name “scientific atheism” (Froese 2004b). Churches were 
no longer able to play a role in public education, religious organisations were monitored or 
prohibited entirely (Froese 2004b), and traditional family structures were eroded by state 
policies that supplied childcare and increased female labour participation (Myers 1996), all 
of which resulted in a weakening of the primary religious-socialisation agencies. In addition, 
rebellious religious leaders were imprisoned (Ramet 1987; Gautiert 1997), church properties 
were confiscated, and some places of worship were transformed into warehouses and 
restaurants (Ramet 1987; Müller and Neundord 2012; Michel 1992; Stan 2009). Contrary to the 
differentiation that the rest of Europe was experiencing, the communist system was intended 
to centralise people’s social lives under the power of the Communist Party. In this situation 
of dramatic and imposed change, the churches were the only institution to still represent 
the traditions of and continuity with the previous system, thus becoming the only source 
of opposition (Tomka 2010). While most sociologists have no quarrel with defining Eastern 
European religiosity as an exception to European patterns of secularisation, the field has yet to 
reach consensus about what occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
Religious Practice and Belief in the Former Communist Countries
Concerning religious practice, Gautiert (1997) and Reistma et al. (2012) have reported 
higher rates of church attendance among the youngest cohort (i.e. those socialised after the 
fall of communism) in each of the Eastern European countries. Pollack (2003) and Greeley 
(1994), in contrast, argue that church attendance has either remained low or has declined in the 
former communist countries; Brenner (2016) supports this finding. For country-specific trends, 
Pollack (2003) identifies Russia and Albania as exceptions to the declining trend, Reistma et 
al. (2012) and Greeley (2003) find declining attendance in Poland, and Borowik (2002) argues 
that religiosity levels in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus are as low as in the most secularised of 
Western countries. Kaariainen (1999) asserts that Russians go to church less frequently than 
other Europeans, while Burkimsher (2014) reports increasing rates of attendance in Russia and 
to a lesser extent in Romania and Bulgaria. While it is difficult to draw a unique picture of 
Eastern European church attendance trends, most appear to resemble Western European trends, 
which are either low and stable or are in decline. Other countries, such as Poland, have rates 
similar to the high-attendance European countries while showing the same negative trends. 
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Only in three countries – Romania, Russia, and Bulgaria –we can observe some evidence of 
increasing attendance (Brenner 2016). 
For religious beliefs, Gautiert (1997) reports strong belief among the youngest cohort, as 
does Kaariainen (1999), while he does report important changes at the beginning of 1990, 
when the number of believers increased significantly. Fox and Tabory (2008) similarly claim 
that religious monopolies have reduced participation (but not belief), while Greeley (1994) 
finds that between one-half and three-quarters of Russians believe in God – a finding that 
Pollack (2003) affirms. Tomka (2010), speaking more generally, notes changing opinions and 
growing interest in religion.
All cues appear to indicate that two different mechanisms have been at work following 
the fall of communism: (1) a reawakening of religious belief that (2) seems to counterbalance 
a stability or even a decrease in religious practice. This is, of course, a general picture, and 
we can pinpoint the main possible exceptions: Russia, Romania, and Bulgaria (Brenner 2016; 
Burkimsher 2014). The literature hints at this idea of diverging trends, especially in Tomka’s 
(2010) discussion of an interpretation of religion that deviates from tradition by becoming 
more diverse and individualistic. Kaariainen (1999) also reports that, since 1991, numbers of 
churches and clergy members have notably increased, but neither of these factors seems to 
have had any influence on attendance at church services. This new religiosity, Borowik (2002) 
says, could be characterised by the avoidance of any duties towards religious institutions. 
These hypothesised differing trends for regular practice and individual belief require 
different explanations. For practice and formal religiosity, it is impossible to forget the severe 
impact that the communist regime had on institutional churches. In pre-communist times, 
denominational institutions’ personnel consisted primarily of priests, deacons, and other 
religious figures. The party completely banned these positions; during the post-communist 
era, the numbers of remaining clergy members were not even enough to sustain normal 
church activities. As the years went on, ecclesiastic institutions’ personnel increasingly 
consisted of well-trained laic Christians (Tomka 2010). Indeed, the eventual reawakening of 
church attendance visible in some Eastern countries precisely shows the ability of institutional 
churches to re-organise themselves following the communist tabula rasa.
If institutional religiosity was something the communist regimes undermined, the 
eradication of personal belief was more difficult to influence, as it appears that “systems of 
belief require more than simply the power of promotion and coercion to become accepted” 
(Froese 2004b, 35). Yet the statement that communist regimes undermined religious practice 
while belief itself remained safe might be overly simplistic. We can summarise at least three 
different explanations for this eventual revival of religious belief. First, this revival could be 
a real revival of Christian belief, similar to what Voas and Crockett (2005, 12) define when 
speaking about the strong version of “believing without belonging”. Greeley (2002, 77) agrees 
with this idea, stating that “those born after 1970 found themselves more likely than their 
immediate predecessors to believe in a God who is concerned about them personally […]. Far 
from being a phenomenon of ‘New Age’ religion, it would appear to be a rebirth of age-old 
religion”. Pollack (2003) has also reported the new forms of religiousness outside the church 
that are emerging in Eastern and Central Europe. 
The second possible explanation concerns exactly what Greeley mentioned as “New Age” 
religion. This interpretation is similar to the weak version of “believing without belonging” 
(Voas and Crockett 2005, 12), which also considers God in a non-Christian manner: not as 
a personal God but as some kind of spirit or life force (Kaariainen 1999). In this way, post-
communist countries’ beliefs can “accumulate”, such that people who declare their belief in 
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God also believe in other phenomena such as reincarnation, astrology, magic, occultism, and 
elements of Eastern religions (Borowik 2002; Kaariainen 1999; Tomka 2010). 
The third possible explanation involves what might be termed a “burning of the bridges” 
factor (Borowik 2002). It is widely known that, until 1981, it was necessary to belong to the 
Communist Party to make advances in one’s career or to be accepted in society; thus, at the 
present time, being a Christian is essentially associated with being an honourable person. 
Religion, having been the only force of opposition, has become practically synonymous with 
anti-communism in the new democratic view of political life (Borowik 2002). Politicians 
are aware of this and have increasingly used religion as a way to legitimise political power 
(Meulemann 2004). It thus appears that this supposed revival is above all a return to tradition, 
a way to reconstruct a country’s collective memory, and a way to reconnect to what existed 
before the regime (Borowik 2002).
A generational matter?
At the time when communist regimes were installed, religion was strongly rooted in Eastern 
European society, so it is not surprising that young people would have been the most receptive 
to the imposed atheism (Borowik 2002) and that these same people would be expected to be less 
religious later in life as well because of the socialisation process during socialism. In contrast, 
the older generation had already developed their system of belief before the beginning of the 
regime and were less prone to change (Müller and Neundord 2012). If the idea of religious 
reawakening is correct, then we should see signs of this revival among the generation who 
came to maturity after communism ended (Evans and Northmore-Ball 2012). This historical 
reconstruction supports the idea of a U-shaped curve of religiosity, the highest levels of which 
represent the older generation born before the regime and the youngest generations who have 
come of age following the fall of the regime. Indeed, some researchers have corroborated this 
hypothesised trend. Greeley (2002), for example, reports the highest belief-scale scores for the 
younger cohorts (those born in the seventies and eighties), as well as for the older cohorts; 
Zrinscak (2004) finds different generational responses to communism; and Pollack (2003) also 
looks at birth cohorts to report evidence for declining attendance with the expectation that 
younger cohorts will be less likely to attend. Although the results about church attendance 
present a somewhat unclear picture, it appears that children do in fact share religiosity levels 
with their grandparents’ generation; a religiosity that their parents’ generation seem to have 
rejected (Greeley 2002, 1994).
The Catholic/Orthodox divide
Our presentation so far has considered the formerly communist European countries as 
being religiously homogeneous; however, it has overlooked possible differences between their 
religious traditions. Eastern countries’ Christianity comprises two different doctrines: Roman 
Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy. Need and Evans (2001) clearly underline the importance 
of considering these religious denominations in order to better understand cross-country 
differences in patterns of religiosity. Halman and Petterson (2003) go further by stating that 
European religiosity is primarily related to religious tradition (rather than to the East/West 
dichotomy), with Protestants and Orthodox being more secular and Catholics being more 
religious. This Catholic/Orthodox divide is clearly visible in many empirical works. Bruce 
(2000) and Need and Evans (2001), for example, report that predominantly Catholic Eastern 
countries have higher rates of attendance than traditionally Orthodox and pluralistic ones. 
In addition, Pollack (2003) finds that predominantly Catholic Eastern European countries 
show high attendance rates that are comparable to their Catholic Western European peers. 
Titarenko (2008) also finds these high rates of mass attendance in Catholic countries compared 
to predominantly Orthodox countries; she interprets this situation as the ability and the 
© RASCEE, www.rascee.net
2017, 10 (1)
Molteni, F.: Religious Change among Cohorts in Eastern Europe 39
willingness of Catholic churches to educate their adherents’ systems of belief. Overall, the 
Catholic Church seems to have more strongly resisted the political and ideological pressure of 
the regime (Pollack 2003). 
In view of these contributions, religious denomination could plausibly have an impact on 
both the level and the trend of religiosity. While Catholic countries have retained relatively 
high levels of religiosity but have not shown any significant increases following the fall of the 
communist regimes, Orthodox countries suffered severe religious decline during the regime 
but have shown an observable and important revival in the aftermath of communism (Müller 
and Neundord 2012).
As these studies have shown, many issues must be addressed when speaking about a 
possible reawakening of religiosity in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism. First, we 
must distinguish a possible increase of regular churchgoing from a possible increase of more 
individualised and intimate beliefs. Second, the prevailing religious denomination likely 
represents an important feature for distinguishing the possible religious trajectories among 
these countries. Third, whether a possible religious reawakening is observable across every 
Eastern European country, or whether a few peculiarities exist, is not clear. A discussion of 
these three issues is vital if we wish to draw a comprehensive picture of Eastern European 
religiosity after the fall of communism. The remainder of this paper will discuss these issues.
Research Questions
As we have seen from the discussion above, in order to better describe trends for Eastern 
European religiosity, it is necessary to disentangle and focus on the two main components of 
this religiosity: religious practice and belief. They may be viewed as different dimensions that 
underline the broad and complex concept of religiosity. They are part of Glock’s (1962) well-
known typology distinguishing a ritualistic dimension (practice) and an ideological dimension 
(belief); many authors have also depicted these dimensions as being central (Voas 2007). 
Religious practice is the dimension that sociologists have most often investigated because of 
its social and collective nature as well as its widespread availability through surveys. Because 
religious practice measures the ritualistic dimension of religiosity, this factor is suitable for 
detecting strong forms of religiosity because it also requires a time commitment (McAndrew 
and Voas 2011). The dimension of religious belief instead regards the supernatural aspects of 
religion; this dimension is concerned with the mixture of dogma that must be accepted and 
recognised in order to comply with a transcendent value (Pace 2007). 
In the theoretical section of this paper, we observed how the changes in these dimensions 
are likely to be interpreted as generational change, starting from a generation socialised before 
the imposition of the communist regime, moving on to a generation socialised by communist-
imposed atheism, and then finishing with a generation who reached maturity after communism 
had ended. This situation reinforces the idea of using cohorts to account for time when studying 
religious trends. This way of proceeding has clear theoretical foundations; cohort replacement 
should be thought of as the main mechanism behind religious change (Voas 2009; Voas and 
Chaves 2016; Voas and Doebler 2011) because of the socialisation effect from the religious 
environment of people’s upbringing.
We can thus combine the multidimensional approach and the need to use cohort replacement 
to account for time and pose our first research question:
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RQ1: Are the trends for practice and belief increasing or decreasing cohort after 
cohort in Eastern Europe?
With this first research question, we aim to determine general trends for the two dimensions 
discussed above. But these trends can subtend certain peculiarities linked to the predominant 
religious tradition. Many authors have discussed the resilience of Catholic countries to forced 
atheism as well as a decrease of religiosity during communist times; they have also discussed a 
resulting reawakening after the end of communism in Orthodox countries. Religious tradition 
is thus something to take into account when drawing a clear picture of Eastern European 
religiosity, which leads us to our second research question:
RQ2: Are the trends for practice and belief different or the same according to the 
prevailing Christian denomination?
In addition to denominational effects, the literature suggests a variety of country-specific 
factors related to the twentieth century’s religiosity trends. For example, many studies have 
reported on a revival of religious practice only in Russia, Romania, and Bulgaria, whereas 
others have pinpointed Poland as a country where religiosity was strengthened by the regime’s 
attempt to impose atheism. These factors lead us to our third research question:
RQ3: Can any country-specific factors be found in the trends for practice and belief?
Data, Variables, and Methods
This research is based on European Values Study (EVS) data, a large-scale, cross-national, 
longitudinal, and survey-based research programme that examines basic human values (EVS 
2011). From this dataset, we chose a subsample of twelve formerly communist Eastern European 
countries – Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, and Ukraine – that participated in at 
least two waves of the survey.1 Starting from this sample, we retained all individuals born 
after 1930 because of the small sample size of this older group. The resulting sample comprises 
39,257 individuals (see Table 1).
EVS survey wave
 1990–1993 (n) 1999–2001 (n) 2008–2010 (n) Total (n)
Belarus 0 902 1,465 2,367
Bulgaria 846 832 1,428 3,106
Czech Republic 1,689 1,631 1,731 5,051
Estonia 884 882 1,423 3,189
Hungary 749 863 1,454 3,066
Latvia 822 874 1,438 3,134
Lithuania 800 932 1,456 3,188
Poland 795 946 1,469 3,210
Romania 909 1,007 1,428 3,344
Russian Federation 0 2,150 1,439 3,589
Slovak Republic 938 1,192 1,386 3,516
Ukraine 0 1,063 1,434 2,497
Total 8,432 13,274 17,551 39,257
TABLE 1: Individuals surveyed by country and survey waves
1 Despite a few minor differences among countries, the general criterion used for sampling was a multistage 
stratified sample with random selection in each stage.
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Dependent variables
As previously discussed, in this analysis we focus on two different dimensions of religiosity: 
religious practice and belief. The method for measuring religious practice is almost standardised 
and essentially refers to church attendance (Ruiter and van Tubergen 2009; Norris and Inglehart 
2004; Voas and Doebler 2011; Biolcati-Rinaldi and Vezzoni 2013; van Ingen and Moor 2015; te 
Grotenhuis et al. 2015). We decided to measure religious practice as the average probability of 
attending church weekly. To build this variable, we started from the survey item “Apart from 
weddings, funerals, and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these 
days?” For example, we assigned a value of 0.99 to those who declare that they attend church 
weekly, a value of 0.23 to those who attend church monthly (12 weeks over 54 weeks in a year), 
and a value of 0.02 to those who attend church once yearly: 1 week over 54 weeks in a year 
(Hout and Greeley 1998; Pisati 2000). 
The measure of religious belief is less standardised and also more complex, because it is 
necessary to disentangle the real core of Christian belief from a more general and syncretic 
spirituality along the lines of “I know that something’s out there”. To measure this, we relied 
on a set of survey items that asked, “Which, if any, of the following do you believe in?” We 
coded people who answered yes to all items concerning God, heaven, and hell (i.e. the essential 
convictions of the Christian theological system) as 1, and 0 otherwise.2
Independent variables
Cohorts and religious tradition represent the independent variables of this analysis. The 
operationalisation of cohorts was straightforward, since we relied on the year of birth and 
treated the variable as being continuous. 
 Obs. Missing Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Practice 36,700 2,557 0.19 0.35 0 0.99
Belief 27,469 11,788 0.37 0.48 0 1
Year of birth 39,159 98 1958.41 15.36 1931 1990
TABLE 2: Summary of individual variables
To answer RQ2, we needed to distinguish the trends for practice and belief according to the 
prevailing Christian doctrine. The variable we used to distinguish among these doctrines was 
defined for each country; the variable was built by summarising the individual information 
gathered from the question, “Which religious denomination to you belong to?” Countries with 
an unclear situation (i.e. those that had high percentages for two different denominations) 
were coded as “mixed” (see Table 3).3
2 Beyond the theoretical reasons, we also had methodological reasons for choosing these three items. Relying on 
the work of van Schuur (2003), it is possible to see these items as ordered and suitable for measuring a latent trait 
(such as religious belief), because “belief in God” and “belief in hell” represent the higher and lower bounds 
of a scale, while “belief in heaven” is located in the middle ranking. Using these items allowed us to focus on 
Christian belief in the strictest sense and to avoid generic spirituality.
3 The categories we found correspond with those of Norris and Inglehart (2004), except for the “mixed” countries, 
which they coded as Protestant.
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Individual religious denominations
 
Roman 
Catholic Protestant Orthodox
Other 
(non-
Christian)
No 
denomination Total
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Roman Catholics
Czech Republic 26.25 2.57 0.14 1.35 69.69 100.00
Hungary 38.01 12.71 0.07 1.83 47.39 100.00
Lithuania 71.22 0.57 3.22 1.29 23.71 100.00
Poland 93.00 0.22 0.22 1.25 5.31 100.00
Slovak Republic 64.22 8.42 1.26 0.94 25.16 100.00
Orthodox
Bulgaria 0.23 0.39 48.41 10.82 40.14 100.00
Belarus 7.91 0.55 54.13 0.55 36.86 100.00
Romania 5.05 1.92 86.29 2.95 3.79 100.00
Russian Fed. 0.28 0.31 49.76 4.13 45.52 100.00
Ukraine 5.76 2.29 46.04 12.54 33.37 100.00
Mixed
Estonia 0.82 9.63 10.95 1.54 77.06 100.00
Latvia 18.15 16.45 17.06 2.79 45.56 100.00
Total 28.36 4.65 24.54 3.26 39.20 100.00
TABLE 3: Individual religious denominations and countries’ Christian traditions
Modelling strategy
We adopted a two-step strategy to answer all three research questions. In the first step, 
we simply computed the means (and the lowess smoothing) of the dependent variables 
associated with each year of birth. Starting from the theoretical bases and from the results 
of this exploration, we identified several inflection points that we then used to compute 
piecewise regressions.4 With Model 1, we ran regressions using the entire sample, Model 2 
divides the data among Christian denominations, and Model 3 distinguishes among countries. 
The final results start from the coefficients of these piecewise regressions. We ran f-tests to 
compare the piecewise models with both the linear and quadratic models in order to evaluate 
the applicability of the piecewise regression. The results showed that the piecewise models 
always worked better than the linear models and often worked better (and never worse) than 
the quadratic models.5
Results
We have followed a two-step procedure to present the results. We first present graphs of 
the computed means for both religious practice and belief; we then present the piecewise 
regressions by reporting the models’ coefficients. We present a summary of the findings related 
to RQ3 in the main text of this paper and have placed the full table in the appendix.
Figure 1 shows the means of practice and belief associated with the different years of birth 
for the entire sample of twelve formerly communist countries; the different shapes of the 
4 Despite the dichotomous dependent variable for belief, we opted to use a linear model to present results that 
would be easier to read and interpret. See Hellevik (2009) for a complete analysis of why linear models with 
dichotomous dependent variables are acceptable or preferable. 
5 These analyses are available upon request from the author.
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trends for the two dimensions are clearly visible in the figure. Religious practice shows a clear 
linear decrease that flattens for the youngest cohorts, whereas religious belief shows a slight 
decrease for those born between 1930 and 1955, a slight increase for those born between 1955 
and 1985 (an increase that is more pronounced after 1970), and a steep decrease for those born 
after 1985.
FIGURE  1: Means and lowess smoothing for practice and belief by year of birth
These inflection points are consistent with both the beginning and the end of the communist 
regime and with findings that have identified the 1970s as the period when the regime started 
to loosen its grip (Froese 2004a; Greeley 2002). Starting from this finding, we can confidently 
say that those born between 1930 and 1955 are people who were socialised under the most 
severe influence of the communist regime. Those born between 1955 and 1985 were instead 
socialised during a period when the communist-imposed atheism was loosening its grip, 
particularly for those born after 1970. People born after 1985 are those who were socialised 
following the complete end of the regime.
Starting from these inflection points, we then move to the piecewise regressions; Table 4 
shows the estimations.
 Practice Belief
1930–1955 -0.005*** -0.004***
1956–1970 -0.001*** 0.003***
1971–1985 -0.002*** 0.006***
1986–1990 0.000 -0.021***
Constant 0.297*** 0.424***
Observations 36,610 27,402
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TABLE 4: Model 1 estimation for religious practice and belief
The results from the piecewise regression confirm what we have seen from Figure 1. The 
trend for practice shows a statistically significant linear decrease for those born between 1930 
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and 1985; the trend flattens for those born after 1985. The trend for belief instead shows a 
statistically significant decrease for those born between 1930 and 1955, a statistically significant 
increase in the following cohorts, and a statistically significant (and very pronounced) decrease 
after 1985. The general scenario is therefore a clear linear decrease for religious practice and 
a reawakening of religious belief that also seems to have reached a peak and reversed course.
To better investigate these findings, the next step is to distinguish the trends among the 
different Christian denominations (Figure 2).
FIGURE  2: Means and lowess smoothing for practice and belief by year of birth, 
divided by prevalent Christian denomination
The graph shows that religious practice follows an almost linear decrease, regardless of the 
prevalent Christian denomination, with small signs of a revival among the youngest cohorts 
for Orthodox-majority countries. The trends for religious belief are consistent with our findings 
from the general picture: we indeed see a decrease among the older cohorts, an increase for 
those born between 1955 and 1985, and a decrease for those born after 1985. This last decrease 
appears to be less pronounced for those who live in Orthodox-majority countries.
In modelling these trends, we adopted the same piecewise strategy as before. The results 
from the model estimations shown in Table 5 confirm what we have stated above: religious 
practice shows a statistically significant decrease among the older cohorts, and the trends 
continue to decrease (or flatten) for those born after 1955. The statistically significant coefficient 
for the 1986–1990 cohort for Orthodox-majority countries confirms a small revival of religious 
practice among the youngest cohort.
 
Practice 
(Catholics)
Practice 
(Mixed)
Practice 
(Orthodox)
Belief 
(Catholics)
Belief 
(Mixed)
Belief 
(Orthodox)
1930–1955 -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.002 -0.002***
1956–1970 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.002** 0.003* 0.003***
1971–1985 -0.002* -0.001 -0.002* 0.008*** 0.002 0.006***
1986–1990 -0.007 -0.006 0.009** -0.022*** -0.024** -0.012
Constant 0.409*** 0.137*** 0.218*** 0.452*** 0.247*** 0.451***
   
Observations 16,978 4,939 14,693 13,090 3,556 10,756
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TABLE 5: Model 2 estimation for religious practice and belief
For religious belief, the coefficients also confirm the picture we have drawn. Belief has 
decreased among the youngest cohorts, increased or flattened among the intermediate 
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cohorts, and again decreased among the youngest cohorts. Only for the Orthodox countries is 
the 1986–1990 coefficient not statistically significant; a conservative approach suggests that we 
should interpret the trend for this cohort as being flat. Other than the different starting levels, 
the trends for those born between 1930 and 1985 are coherent among the three denominations: 
a basic linear decrease for practice and a decrease followed by an increase for belief. For the 
youngest cohort, the trend for religious belief is reversed in Catholic and mixed countries, 
whereas it flattens for Orthodox countries. Religious practice, in contrast, continues to decline 
in Catholic and mixed countries, whereas it slightly increases in Orthodox countries.
To help dig deeper into these results, the next step assesses the trends for individual 
countries. Figure 3 shows markedly different patterns for the various formerly communist 
countries.
FIGURE  3: Means and lowess smoothing for practice and belief by year of birth 
divided by country
As before, the best way to summarise this information is to look at the piecewise model 
coefficients. We have included the complete table in the appendix; we will present a summary 
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of the model here (Table 6). It is vital to stress with these results that the sample size is now 
smaller than what the first two models used – ranging between 1,272 for Lithuania and 3,830 
for the Czech Republic – which clearly introduces a certain level of fuzziness in the results. 
Adopting an approach based on statistical significance is thus a very conservative but necessary 
choice. 
  Practice Belief
 Denomination Average levela
19
30
-1
95
5
19
56
-1
97
0
19
71
-1
98
5
19
86
-1
99
0
Average 
levela
19
30
-1
95
5
19
56
-1
97
0
19
71
-1
98
5
19
86
-1
99
0
Czech Rep. Catholic 0.184 ↘ ─ ─ ↘ 0.253 ↘ ↗ ↗ ↘
Hungary Catholic 0.234 ↘ ─ ─ ─ 0.257 ↘ ─ ↗ ─
Lithuania Catholic 0.474 ↘ ─ ─ ─ 0.829 ↘ ─ ─ ─
Poland Catholic 0.778 ↘ ─ ↘ ↗ 0.619 ↘ ↗ ─ ─
Slovak Rep. Catholic 0.589 ↘ ─ ─ ─ 0.598 ↘ ─ ─ ─
Bulgaria Orthodox 0.131 ↘ ─ ─ ↗ 0.229 ↘ ↗ ↗ ─
Belarus Orthodox 0.198 ↘ ─ ↘ ─ 0.449 ─ ─ ─ ─
Romania Orthodox 0.415 ↘ ↘ ─ ─ 0.671 ─ ↘ ↗ ─
Russian Fed. Orthodox 0.117 ↘ ↗ ─ ↗ 0.452 ↘ ↗ ─ ─
Ukraine Orthodox 0.198 ↘ ─ ─ ─ 0.453 ─ ─ ↗ ─
Estonia Mixed 0.118 ↘ ─ ─ ─ 0.191 ─ ─ ─ ─
Latvia Mixed 0.154 ↘ ─ ─ ─ 0.304 ↘ ↗ ─ ↘
a: Constant coefficients from Model 3
↗: Statistically significant (p<0.1) increase
↘: Statistically significant (p<0.1) decrease
─: No statistically significant effect
TABLE 6: Summary of Model 3 coefficients
The picture is easy to draw when we look at religious practice: practice has decreased for 
every country in the older cohorts; the trends have then flattened or continued to decrease for 
those born between 1955 and 1985 (except for the Russian Federation, but with a very small 
coefficient of 0.001). Among the youngest cohort, in contrast, we find a statistically significant 
revival of religious practice for the Russian Federation and Bulgaria (starting from a very low 
level) and Poland.
Religious belief confirms the interesting pattern we found in the previous models. We see 
a decrease among the older cohorts in almost every country, a statistically significant increase 
in many countries among the intermediate cohorts (1956–1985), and a decrease or flattening 
among the youngest cohorts (born after 1985). The data points to a revival of belief for those 
who grew up during the less oppressive phase of communist rule; it also shows that this effect 
has worn off among the youngest cohorts. 
The common idea behind this data suggests that the supposed Eastern European religious 
reawakening is essentially related to the belief dimension; this phenomenon also appears to 
either be finished or to have stabilised. In contrast, it seems that some countries, such as the 
Russian Federation, Bulgaria, and Poland (and to some degree Romania, Ukraine, Belarus, 
and Hungary), have broken with the descending trend of religious practice and now show a 
kind of minor revival among the youngest cohorts.
Discussion 
The analytical framework of this work was designed according to a general-to-particular 
reasoning. We started by describing and modelling the trends for religious practice and belief 
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for the entire sample, the aim of which was to draw a general picture of Eastern European 
religiosity. We then modelled the trends by discriminating between different Christian 
denominations with the aim of determining any peculiarities linked to the prevalent religious 
tradition. By necessity, the last step was to model and delineate the trends for each country 
in the sample. The results justify this framework choice, since different specificities emerged 
while moving from the general to the particular.
The general picture shows markedly different trends between religious practice and belief. 
Religious practice has been in decline for cohort after cohort, and only in the youngest cohort 
has the trend flattened. The trend for religious belief is quite peculiar: while religious belief 
has declined among the oldest cohort, that trend has become completely reversed among the 
intermediate cohorts. The trend is again reversed for the youngest cohort, eventually becoming 
strongly negative. In the theoretical section of this paper, we have seen how communist 
regimes undermined institutional religiosity by confiscating church properties, closing places 
of worship, and imprisoning rebellious religious leaders. It is thus not surprising that the trend 
of religious practice did not strongly reverse itself once communist regimes started to loosen 
their grip. While institutional religiosity may have been easier to eradicate, the eradication of 
personal belief was harder to do, because a system of belief requires more than the power of 
coercion to become accepted or refused (Froese 2004b). 
We have summarised three different possible explanations for an eventual revival of 
religious belief. A revival of this kind can be (1) a real revival of strong Christian belief; (2) 
a switch to a more syncretic religiosity, in which beliefs accumulate (i.e. people who declare 
a belief in God also believe in other phenomena such as reincarnation, astrology, magic, 
occultism, and elements of Eastern religions); or (3) a way to reconstruct a national identity 
and to “burn bridges” with the communist past. When we put together all the information we 
have gathered, the most plausible interpretation seems to be a mix of the three. In a scenario 
created by the church’s inability to support regular churchgoing, people started to declare 
their religious beliefs once the communist regimes began to loosen their grip. This situation 
resulted in a new form of religiosity; it may be interpreted as a distance from the regime 
while being little institutionalized and based on individual belief. The reversing trend we 
have observed among the youngest cohorts (those who were socialised following the fall of 
communism) may be interpreted as the diminished need for people to reaffirm their non-
involvement with the regime.
Having this general picture in place allows us a first impression and confirms the need to 
look at religious practice and belief separately. Many of the differences we found were also 
present when grouping the countries according to their prevalent Christian denominations. 
We saw how the trends for Catholic and “mixed” countries confirmed the general picture we 
have presented. Religious practice has declined cohort after cohort until reaching a plateau: 
higher for Catholics, and lower (close to 0.05) for mixed countries. More interesting patterns 
emerge when we examine Orthodox countries. After a declining or flat trend among the 
older cohorts, the trend for religious practice became positive among the youngest cohort; in 
addition, the trend for belief partially differs vis-à-vis the other denominations. After having 
declined among the older cohort and increased among the intermediate cohorts, religious 
belief became noticeably flattened for the youngest cohort. We have thus characterised the 
youngest cohort by a slightly increasing level of religious practice and a stable – and very high 
– level of religious belief. 
In order to delve more deeply into these considerations, it is essential to shift the focus to 
individual countries. The results show that all Orthodox countries are experiencing a kind 
of minor religious revival, characterised by stable religious belief (after major growth) and 
increasing practice among the youngest cohort (one that is more evident for the Russian 
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Federation and Bulgaria and less evident for Romania, Belarus, and Ukraine). Many Catholic 
countries, meanwhile, are experiencing an overall decrease of religiosity (as in Lithuania), a 
partial revival (as in Poland and to a lesser extent Hungary), or a flat stability (as in the Czech 
Republic, at a very low level, and in the Slovak Republic). The trends for mixed countries (such 
as Estonia and Latvia) fall into this third category, with stable and very low trends. 
To summarise, we can confidently say that the supposed religious revival is mainly found 
among the Orthodox countries (with the clearest indications found in Bulgaria and the 
Russian Federation) and in only two Catholic countries: Poland and Hungary. As reported in 
the theoretical section of this paper, many studies have noted a revival of church attendance, 
especially for Romania, Bulgaria, and the Russian Federation (Pollack 2003; Burkimsher 2014; 
Brenner 2016). Many other studies (e.g. Greeley 1994; Borowik 2002; Bruce 2003; Müller and 
Neundord 2012) have depicted Poland as an exceptional case, given that Polish Catholicism 
played a leading role during the communist regime and in the regime’s overthrow. We are 
very close to confirming these findings. 
We can see the importance of Poland being a Catholic country during the communist regime 
from the high levels of practice and belief there, albeit in decline among the older cohort 
(Zrinscak 2004). Many observers have viewed the Russian Federation as the leading example 
of the Eastern European reawakening of religiosity. From our results, we are inclined to agree 
with Borowik’s assessment (2002); Borowik argues that Russian religiosity is quite eclectic and 
that its connection with the Orthodox Church is somewhat theoretical in nature. Although we 
do not have data to support or deny it, this argument seems visible in the increase of beliefs 
that can also be syncretic. In addition, this increase in levels of personal belief is supported by 
the minor growth we found in traditional and institutional religiosity, which people use as a 
way of burning bridges with their communist past (Mitrokhin 1994), and is consistent with 
religion becoming an integrating factor in Russian society (Titarenko 2008). This growth is 
visible within the increasing trend for church attendance among the youngest cohort. 
The case of Bulgaria is less easy to explain, but the results appear to be consistent with two 
different mechanisms at work. The first mechanism, which is common to all the Orthodox-
majority Eastern European countries, essentially focusses on the overlap between religiousness 
and national identity; as Borowik (2006) says, being Orthodox and Bulgarian is almost the 
same thing. The second mechanism instead has to do with the less intense communist religious 
persecution that took place in Bulgaria (Borowik 2006), which would be consistent with an 
easier restoration process for institutional religion after the fall of communism.
Conclusion
To conclude, our findings show that the communist regime was successful in eradicating 
institutional religiosity in the form of regular churchgoing but less so in eradicating personal 
beliefs. This situation is evident in the increasing trend of religious belief after the most severe 
stages of the various regimes’ religious persecution had ended. Something changed in the 
youngest cohort, which consists of people who were socialised after the regime had ended. 
People’s need to burn bridges with their communist past seems to have ended in Catholic-
majority countries, where beliefs have started to drop, and all indications point towards Catholic 
Eastern European countries resembling Western European trends in the near future. The only 
possible exceptions to these trends are found in Poland and, to a lesser extent, Hungary. The 
Orthodox countries, in contrast, seem to be experiencing a kind of religious revival, as shown in 
their slightly increasing religious practice (especially in the Russian Federation and Bulgaria) 
and high and stable religious belief among the youngest cohort. Many authors have argued 
that this supposed revival is only related to a minor and temporary period effect (Pollack 
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2003; Froese 2001); at the moment, we are unable to either confirm or deny that claim with a 
sufficient degree of certainty.
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